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Abstract: Economic theory has not been delving extensively and systematically into the 
strictly related phenomena of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Multinational Enterprise 
(MNE) until the 1980s.1 Two distinct circumstances have been favouring this recent renewed 
interest: a big surge in the former and a new space for the latter in the mainstream economic 
theory. FDI – the main way through which MNEs act – has been growing recently at an 
impressive rate (more than world trade), and that this growth has had the puzzling feature of 
concerning particularly the industrialised countries, which have been reciprocally engaged in 
such capital movements. The emergence of a new body of trade and location theory made it 
possible to enhance the understanding of this phenomenon. 
The overall theme is on the frontier of the research in international trade and applied 
industrial economics, and it is complex and unsettled. The subject of this paper is just to fix 
up ideas about some selected topics. Section I briefly reviews the general theoretical setting 
from the appearance of the OLI paradigm in the late ‘70s to  what has been evolving through 
the subsequent two decades. Section II  surveys the main effects of FDI on the home and the 
host countries respectively. Section III  focuses on European economic geography with the 
interest in the effects of European economic integration on MNEs’ activity in the form of 
FDI. Some concluding remarks close the paper. 
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Conferences for their helpful comments. The paper is also part of  the research project "Infrastructure, 
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acknowledged. The usual disclaimers apply. 
 
1    As far as MNEs are concerned: “My informal estimate is that the stock of literature…appearing since 1982 is 
roughly as large as that published between the birth of Christ and 1982” [Caves (1996), p. IX]. Hirsch speaks 
of his paper as “a contribution to the emerging theory of the multinational firm” [Hirsch (1976), p. 258]. 
Vernon (1994) explicitly attributes this feature to the structural theoretical inability of neoclassical economics 
to deal with such a concept of the firm and to all the “imperfections” which accompany it.  
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I. The evolution of the theory 
The conceptual framework used until very recently was the one proposed by Dunning,2 
which is generally referred to as the “OLI paradigm”, the acronym for Ownership, Location, 
Internalisation. Three conditions have to be fulfilled in order for a firm to become a 
multinational: the ownership (O) advantages must be such as to make it profitable for the firm 
to relocate abroad its own production (or at least part of it); there must be some localisation 
(L) advantage, typically linked to the host country’s specific characteristics; it must be more 
convenient the  firm to manage its advantages internally (I) rather than trade them through the 
market.  
The ownership advantages are mainly nested in the so-called proprietary “intangible” 
assets or knowledge-capital assets (such as firm-specific technical knowledge or human 
capital, particular properties like trade marks and other characteristics able to differentiate the 
product, brand reputation included, or simply the firm’s ability to innovate frequently) which 
“take on the quality of public goods, that is their marginal usage cost is zero or 
minimal……and, although their origin may be partly determined by the industry or country 
characteristics of enterprises, they can be used anywhere” [Dunning (1977), p. 401), italics in 
original]. In other words, they can be spread over more than one plant, thus generating the so-
called firm-economies of scale.3 The ownership advantages must exist in order to offset the 
transaction costs incurred by the firm in expanding abroad, typically those related to learning 
“how to do things” in foreign countries (i.e., foreign culture and legal system, often foreign 
language). The location advantages can originate from barriers to trade or from greater 
proximity to final markets, and they can also be country-specific, such as those related to the 
availability of inputs at cheaper prices. Thirdly, there must be an incentive to keep under the 
same “head” (the internalisation advantage) the control of the geographically dispersed 
production instead of resorting to trade-arrangements like licensing, franchising and some 
others in the same category. In order to give rise to MNEs, ownership, location, and 
internalisation advantages obviously must be such as to render foreign production more 
profitable than trade.  
The “OLI paradigm” appeared to be a very useful framework for gathering together 
different features of firms’ opportunities to become multinationals, and it has helped in the 
                                                          
2     Mainly Dunning  (1977), and, inter alia, Dunning (1981).  
3    Or economies of multi-plant production, or multi-plant economies of scale.  
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empirical assessment of the phenomenon.4 Like all taxonomies nevertheless, it turns out to be 
consistent with more than one behavioural model.5  A more solid theoretical assessment  soon 
became urgent. 
From the theoretical point of view, the traditional trade theory was certainly not the 
right place to deal with  firms facing such a complex decision problem as to become 
multinationals. As Helpman and Krugman point out: “In the perfectly competitive, constant 
return world of traditional theory there are no visible firms and thus no way to discuss issues 
hinging on the scope of activities carried out within firms. Again, in reality much international 
trade consists of intrafirms transactions rather than arms’ length dealings between unrelated 
parties, and multinational firms are a prominent part of the international landscape”.6  
In the early 80s a “new” trade theory emerged mainly to account for two pieces of 
strong empirical evidence: nearly half the world’s trade consists of trade between industrial 
countries that are fairly similar in their relative factor endowment, and there exists a 
substantial7 amount of intra-industry trade, i.e. two-way trade in the differentiated goods of 
the same industry, which are very likely to have similar factor intensity. These facts barely (if  
at all) conformed the conventional theory, which was explaining trade entirely by differences 
among countries.  
The new trade theory of the 1980s allowed for (static) internal economies of scale due 
to increasing returns, and consequent imperfect competition as a market structure (mainly 
Cournot oligopoly and monopolistic competition).8 In such a framework the endogenous 
setting up of firms as multinationals can be theoretically investigated [Helpman - Krugman 
(1985), Ch. 12 and 13)] even though “the relationship between increasing returns, intra-firm 
trade and direct foreign investment is more indirect” [Helpman - Krugman (1985), p. 4)] 
In fact, this is a particularly complex topic, which probably needs a multidisciplinary 
approach (business economics, operative industrial organisation, economic geography, 
probably also a little bit of social-anthropology in so far as the culture of the firm is 
concerned) and certainly cannot be satisfactorily treated within the neo-classical perspective 
alone, which is still very prominent in the new trade theory.  
                                                          
4    See Caves (1996) for a detailed assessment of the empirical research based on the OLI framework. 
5    For a critical overview of the OLI paradigm, see for instance Graham (1996), pp.186-191. 
6    Helpman - Krugman (1985), p. 3. However, Markusen (1995), (1998) will raise this same critique to the 
“new trade theory”. See fn. 27 below.  
7    The intra-industry trade is estimated as roughly as one third of world trade.  
8    See – as a summa of the new trade theory – Helpman - Krugman (1985), where the originally developed 
theoretical setting is clearly defined in Ch. 2. 
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In 1984, two models – very similar and yet different at the same time – appeared, 
destined to become the origins of two strands of research, which eventually partly joined 
together. The first one [Helpman (1984)] was subsequently enlarged and incorporated in 
Helpman – Krugman (1985), with upstream activities (headquarter services or intermediate 
goods) highly specific to downstream activity, all being subject to economies of scale. In this 
kind of situation it is likely that an integrated firm will arise in order to avoid bilateral 
monopolies considered to be a source of various inefficiencies. The firm is either a single-
product one, in the case where its highly specialised inputs such as management and product-
specific R&D are in a location which is geographically separate from the serviced plants, or it 
has production facilities in more than one country in the case of the intermediates, becoming 
vertically integrated. A sort of implicit two-step decision process is at work: increasing 
returns give firms incentives to integrate, thus becoming multinationals, and cost 
considerations suggest to them where to locate.9 Here the true novelty is given by the explicit 
modelling of increasing returns, whilst location follows the traditional theories. In this setting, 
which is still in harmony with the Heckscher/Ohlin context insofar as different factor costs 
given by differences in endowment across countries are concerned, intra-industry trade can 
take place, but there is no room for trade between similar, equally developed, countries 
(where factor-prices should be equal).  
The second model [Markusen (1984)] bears more on Dunning’s original insight and 
related industrial organisation literature,10 and pushes further the implications given by the 
presence of “intangibles”, using explicitly the concept of economies of multi-plant operation: 
management or R&D – the same services invoked by Helpman’s model – work here as a joint 
input giving a single two-plant firm a cost efficiency over two single-plant firms.11 In order to 
avoid any kind of Heckscher/Ohlin effect12 the countries under consideration are equal in 
every respect, above all their factor endowment. Exclusively because of multi-plant 
economies of scale, the multinational enterprise sets up production facilities in both countries, 
                                                          
9   “This feature brings about the emergence of multinational corporations as a response to tendencies of factor 
rewards to differ across countries. Here the emphasis is on one source of pressure on relative factor rewards: 
differences in relative factor endowment”. Helpman-Krugman (1985), p. 228. 
10   “…the general equilibrium literature on factor movements is of little use and a theory of the firm approach 
may be more useful”. Ibid., p. 206. 
11   “By “economies of multi-plant operation” we will mean technical or pecuniary advantages possessed by a 
single owner of two or more production facilities over an industry in which there are independent owners of 
the same production facilities”. Ibid., p. 205-206. 
12   “The model should not rely on factor movements or factor price differences insofar as the MNE literature 
stresses that the MNE often provides for much of its needs from local factor markets”. Ibid., p. 206. 
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so becoming a horizontally integrated firm: plants in different locations (countries) produce 
the same product. 
Alongside the proper new trade theory and by the hand of one of its fathers, another 
close but slightly less orthodox strand of research has come into the picture and has evolved 
through time into what is now called the “new economic geography”.13  In this broad and 
highly fertile approach - which goes well beyond the issue under consideration here14 - the 
main focus is on industry-localisation. Picking up the Marshallian tradition of external 
economies, Hirschman’s idea of backward and forward linkages, Myrdal’s (and Kaldor’s) 
suggestion of circular (and cumulative) causation, and letting these pieces of theories interact 
in models of monopolistic competition of the Dixit-Stiglitz type with increasing returns,15 
location choices become endogenous variables. In particular, they appear to be very sensitive 
to some key variables, transport-costs above all, with which they have a non-monotonic 
relationship. We will return to transport costs very soon. 
Still on the new economic geography approach,16 multiple equilibria are generally 
present: in fact, many outcomes are possible depending on the specific assumptions of the 
models and on the values of the parameters as well. Complete polarisation of industry in an 
(industrial)-core-(agricultural)-periphery shaped world, multiple clusters (i.e. agglomerations 
of firms in narrowly defined sectors of activity and geographically scattered), and dispersion 
of firms can occur as well. Broadly speaking, intra-industry trade and inter-industry trade are 
expected when there is, respectively, industry-dispersion (at sector-level) and, on the contrary, 
industry-concentration. The mobility of factors of production (both labour and capital, i.e. 
firms) in response to a changing context contributes to endogenising  the pattern of location, 
which can mutate through time. Thus so far the main body of the literature.  
Nevertheless, many important and non-trivial corollaries can be added, each of them 
representing a strand of fertile ongoing research. The likelihood of any change (and its pace as 
well) in the landscape of the industrial pattern of an area depends inter alia on the initial 
conditions and on the evolution of the process up to then: the history matters and the path-
dependence issues17 – with the possible and unpleasant consequence of lock-in-type situations 
                                                          
13   The obvious starting reference is Krugman (1991b).  
14   See for instance, the most recent outcomes in Fujita-Krugman-Venables (1999). For a new direction of   
research, see Krugman (1996). 
15   See Krugman (1991c). 
16   For a survey of the new economic geography, see Ottaviano-Puga (1998). 
17   The usual basic references are Arthur (1988), (1989) and David (1985). See also Krugman (1991a).  
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– start to be thought of as essential ingredients of the story. Thus, institutions can have a 
prominent role in framing the economic environment, and they cease to be just in the 
background.  
The changing trend of industrial location is in turn highly responsible for the convergent  
(or divergent) pattern across areas (states, regions), which is today one of the main concerns 
with regard to European integration, and to the world development process in general. The 
standard measures of convergence - mostly related to the rate of growth of aggregate 
production – can be no longer a good indicator of similarity, in so far as they might be hiding 
high concentration of different industries in different areas, with clustering of unemployment 
(on the hypothesis that different industries require different types of labour and on the 
evidence for Europe that labour is quite immobile) following the clustering of firms. This 
concern leads directly to the income distribution issue facing an integration process: income 
disparities across the regions of the EU are wide, and there is some evidence of a rise in the 
degree of inequalities between European regions over the past decade.18  
These topics are not yet covered consistently in the main literature, and the overall 
theoretical assessment lags far behind a full comprehension of the many forces at work; the 
empirical evidence is still spotty and not even consistent within itself. Nevertheless, these 
issues are starting to be accepted and seen as important themes in relation to how complex 
systems evolve, even though economic theory generally does not like, and is reluctant to 
accept, multiple results, which would make the organisation of economic activity quite 
unpredictable. 
Let us go back to the parting of the new economic geography from the more traditional 
new trade theory but still keep our main focus on multinational enterprises. Two aspects are 
worth stressing.  
For firms that move geographically in order to maximise profits, the choice of location 
is a strategic variable and makes space a priority. Notwithstanding this new perspective, these 
firms are still integrated production units producing one product in one location, and this 
unique production facility represents a theoretical setting not so suitable for studying the 
emergence of an MNE, which is by definition a multi-plant firm [Markusen (1995), p. 169 
and Markusen (1998), p. 11]. In fact, the increasing returns here are nested at the plant level, 
thus implying cost efficiency of centralised production, a feature that leads to geographical 
                                                          
18   See, for instance, Puga (1999). 
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concentration instead of multi-location dispersion. Moreover, there seems to be an inherent 
contradiction between the existence of imperfect competition and market power on the one 
side, and the absence of multinational enterprises, which develop just in that type of market 
structure, on the other.19  
The second noticeable feature relates to the new and striking role of transport costs, 
which in the traditional theory did nothing except reduce slightly the gains from trade, 
whereas now they play a substantial role in the allocation of economic activity.  
Transport costs were already present at least in Horstmann-Markusen (1987), where 
they contributed substantially to the outcome in as much as branch-plant production 
depended, inter alia, on their existence. More precisely, in the above contribution a horizontal 
MNE arises in equilibrium “if firm specific and export costs are large relative to plant scale 
economies” [Horstmann-Markusen (1987), p. 110]. In other words, transport costs represent 
here, in a world of “equal” countries, the logical correspondence of factor endowment in a 
world of “different countries”: the potentiality of multi-plant economies of scale here (the 
plant economies of scale, there) give firms incentives to integrate, thus becoming 
multinationals, and transport or export cost considerations here (factor costs, there), suggest to 
them where to locate.  
The prominent role in the new economic geography approach rendered transport costs a 
very important variable unavoidable from then onward, despite of its likely ambiguous effect. 
In fact, besides the theoretical non-monotonicity of the relation between transport costs  and 
industrial concentration referred to above, they could affect MNEs’ activity in an opposite 
way depending on whether firm-integration was vertical or horizontal: an increase in transport 
costs induces horizontal integration but works against the vertical one, in a ceteris paribus 
situation.  
The emphasis on the strong linkages between industrial location and the geographical 
characteristics of the market (both size and closeness), which is one of the main features of 
the new economic geography approach, suggested also a “new” way of looking at that MNEs’ 
activity consisting of displacing production abroad instead of exporting. At the beginning of 
the 1990s some key elements – common to the most cited papers20 throughout – consolidated 
                                                          
19  This is a well-known point of argument coming back to Hymer’s contribution, which even precedes 
Dunning’s insight as far as the ownership element is concerned. See Cohen et al. (eds.), (1979), Introduction, 
Dunning himself (1977), p. 397, and more recently Cantwell (2000), p. 13. 
20   Brainard (1993a) and (1993b), Horstmann-Markusen (1992), Markusen-Venables (1996), Markusen-
Venables  (1995). The chronological order in which the last two have been published does not respect the 
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the theoretical background in what we could call an “eclectic” model: some firm-level activity 
with the “jointness” feature, plant-level economies of scale, transport (or tariff, or export) 
costs. The type of product, whether differentiated or homogeneous, does not seem to have any 
dramatic importance.21 The interplay of these elements allows the market structure to be 
determined endogenously as the outcome of the plant location decision by firms. Thus, in this 
generation of models, horizontal MNEs arise when – broadly speaking – the cost structure is 
larger than plant-level scale economies, and when the countries are similar, in size and 
relative factor endowment, thus matching the main elements of the empirical evidence. In 
Brainard (1993a) and (1993b), for instance, countries are similar in size and factor 
endowment, and firms’ decision whether to export or to produce in the foreign countries is 
based upon a trade-off between the advantages of local concentration versus proximity to final 
markets, in what has become famous as the proximity-concentration hypothesis. Firms must 
balance the benefits of exploiting plant economies of scale with the costs of transport and 
trade; roughly speaking, the higher the latter and firm-economies of scale are relatively to 
plant-economies of scale, the more FDI will take place, serving horizontal MNEs. While 
Ekholm (1998) finds just some empirical support for the proximity-concentration trade-off 
hypothesis, 22 Brainard (1993b) finds qualified empirical support, and Brainard (1993c) adds 
further proof rejecting a pure factor proportions explanation of multinational activity.  
In the theoretical setting recalled above, vertical MNEs, too, can arise, of course, even 
though the main theoretical interest (led by the need to be in tune with the empirical evidence) 
tends towards the horizontal type.  
In Markusen-Venables (1995) and (1996), special attention is paid to the size of the 
countries: a dynamic simulation is performed, and the result is the emergence of 
multinationals (over national firms) as countries become more similar (in size, technology, 
and relative factor endowment) in what since has been called the “convergence” hypothesis. 
The intuition is, in one of the authors’ words, that “ the single-plant firms derive their 
advantage from the fact that their production is concentrated in the country in which sales are 
larger, factor costs are lower, and/or real factor productivity is higher. When the countries are 
quite different, the multinationals derive their disadvantage from having to locate costly 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
order in which they have been written. The last one is a refined and enlarged version of the pre-last one. See 
Markusen-Venables  (1995), p. 3, fn. 2.  
21    “..the rich results obtained below demonstrate that product differentiation is not required to produce such 
results.” Markusen-Venables (1996), p. 188, fn. 3.  
22   It should not be forgotten that Ekholm uses Swedish data while Brainard works on US data. 
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additional capacity in the small and/or costly market” [Markusen (1995), p. 180)]. This 
challenging hypothesis has found some empirical support in Ekholm [1998], and very recently 
also in Barrios et al., (2001), that specifically aimed at verifying it.  
In Markusen et al. (1996) the three models present in the literature – all having in 
common increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition – arise from a unique root, as 
special cases for some set of parameter values. The three models are: (i) a “new trade theory”-
based one (a single-plant, national firm); (ii) one with a horizontal multinational which 
chooses between serving a foreign market by exports and by building a branch plant; and (iii) 
one with a vertical multinational.  In this contribution and in Markusen (1998) – which 
overlaps as far as these aspects are concerned – the theoretical taxonomy gives us an answer 
(sometimes more, sometimes less convincing) as to how and when horizontal, vertical MNEs, 
and national firms prevail over each other, due to the interplay of transport costs, size of 
countries, firms’ (and countries’) factor intensity, firm-level and plant-level economies of 
scale [Markusen (1998), pp. 19-24]. Once again, transport costs turn out to be a crucial 
variable: more specifically, given firm and plant scale economies, the same transport costs 
regime has opposite effects depending on the difference or the similarity between countries. 
High transport costs support horizontal MNEs between countries which are similar (in size 
and factor endowment),23 but they favour concentration the larger one country is than the 
other, for a given factor intensity. In fact, national firms with headquarters in the larger 
country do not have any incentive to become MNEs and to make a fixed-cost investment to 
serve a small market, while export costs would be tolerable even with high transport costs 
because there is not much output to be shipped to the small country. Nor is there any reason 
why vertical MNEs should arise, given the similarity in factor endowment and the high 
transport costs regime. On the other side, low transport costs mean that the country size ceases 
to be an advantage and depresses MNEs’ activity, both horizontal and (with similar country-
endowment) vertical.  
This generation of eclectic models copes with the first two elements of the OLI 
paradigm: ownership and localisation. In fact, the “firm-specific” asset with the “jointness” 
characteristic, which gives rise to multi-plant economies of scale, involves many elements: 
inter alia, superior technological knowledge, organisational and managerial skills pertaining 
to the human capital of the firm, patents, trade marks or particular design that can render 
                                                          
23   As in Brainard  (1993a) and (1993b). 
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unique the product of the firm; all these constitute the so-called “intangibles”, which are the 
essence of the ownership advantage. The technical component of the production facilities (the 
plant economies of scale), together with the physical characteristics of both home and host 
countries (size, factor endowment, proximity) and the policies as well (trade and transport 
costs), make it possible to debate about location. What is not yet covered in the “pure” 
economic literature is the internalisation issue: why should a firm behave as a self-sufficient 
unit instead of collaborating with foreign firms through various types of commercial 
agreements? That is to say, why do firms choose direct investment instead of licensing? With 
the noticeable exception of Ethier (1986) and Horstman-Markusen (1987), there are virtually 
no contributions which explicitly deal with this issue in the new upsurge in the theory of trade 
of the ‘80s:24 internalisation is taken as a matter of course. The former includes in the model 
firm-specific assets such as research effort and product quality, while the second includes 
firm’s reputation for quality; both papers basically found that direct investment prevails over 
licence when there is imperfect information in the product market. The numerous and varied 
kinds of information-asymmetries are concisely reviewed by Markusen [(1995), pp. 81-84] 
and more extensively by Caves [(1996), Ch. 7]. 
Unlike international trade literature, business and industrial organisation economics has 
plenty of studies on this specific aspect of multinational activity. The results are not clear-cut, 
given the many facets of the issue, but nevertheless they seem to agree on some basic facts: in 
general, licensing is preferred to direct investment when the size of the market does not allow 
entry at a sufficient scale, when firms lack experience of foreign markets, when the industry’s 
technology is changing rapidly so that the rents to the intangible asset are short-lived. By 
contrast, direct investment is the chosen option when licensing is very costly to arrange 
because of the difficulty of defining the capability to be transferred or of enforcing the 
agreement, for instance in the new technologies sector.  
It appears evident that this approach is more fruitful for studying the problem of 
internalisation, which undoubtedly has a strong connection with – if not dependence on – the 
way a firm is structured and organised. Even traditional trade theorists like Ethier, Markusen 
and Horstmann have dealt recently with the problem of internalisation. Ethier-Markusen 
(1996) treated the specific point of the possible dissipation of intellectual property: in order to 
                                                          
24   “Internalisation is the only one of the three key elements not already incorporated into trade theory. [……] 
Internalisation is one of our critical “black boxes” always appealed but never explained”. Ethier (1986), pp. 
805-806. 
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prevent this, firms choose to transfer the knowledge capital internally. The theoretical setting 
combines elements typical of the “new trade theory” with features of the industrial 
organisation theory, specifically considering the firm’s inability to enforce contracts. 
Moreover, it allows a complex interplay of location and internalisation aspects insofar as 
foreigners learn faster how to produce the goods when they are produced in their country 
rather than when they are imported. The results depend heavily on the parameters; 
nevertheless, the main suggestion is “that similarities in relative factor endowment may 
promote direct investment when account is taken of the desire to protect knowledge-based 
capital” [Ethier-Markusen (1996), p. 24].25 More recently, Horstmann-Markusen (1996) 
investigated the costs of gathering information about new markets, setting up a model which 
predicts “that a contractual arrangement is more likely when markets are on average small and 
investment mistakes are very costly …..,  and conversion from a contractual arrangement to 
owned sales operation can be achieved quickly” [Horstmann-Markusen (1996), p. 3]. These 
findings seem to be confirmed by empirical evidence from studies on survey data relating to 
Australian firms in East Asia and Japanese firms in Australia, which the authors quote. 
As for the internalisation aspect, and still with few noticeable exceptions,26 for a long 
time economic theory mentioned only the movement of capital – the FDI - leaving MNEs to 
the field of business economics on the silent assumption that MNEs and FDI are coincident 
concepts. On the contrary, even though they are the two sides of the same coin – the 
internationalisation of production – they are different sides, FDI being just one aspect of the 
MNEs’ broader activity. Since there was no room in economic theory to explain MNEs’ 
behaviour, and since FDI has been relatively moderate in size till very recently, the main 
scholarly interest was a simple overall assessment of their effect either on the home country - 
specifically on trade - or on the host country. Given that FDI used to go traditionally to 
countries with cheap factor-prices and large natural resources, i.e. underdeveloped countries 
in general, the host-country effect of FDI was something confined to the issues of 
development, and the main task remained one of assessing the relationship between FDI and 
trade. By the 1970s, however, the traditional pattern of capital flowing from “North” to 
“South” turned into a flow from “North” to “North”, and MNEs started to be investigated as 
                                                          
25   Ethier-Markusen (1996), p. 24. This article was previously an NBER WP dating to 1993, and it is very often 
quoted as such, for instance in Markusen (1995), which contains a simplified version of it. 
26   Hirsch (1976) and Horst’s wide production on this theme, quoted by Caves (1996).  
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an important actor in trade theory, as we just sew. Thus, many new questions arose about the 
effects of their main activity – the FDI – on both the host and home countries.  
 In what follows we will just sketch the main directions of the literature, and the most 
robust results.  
 
II. The effects of FDI: home-country effect 
II.1 FDI and trade 
The usual example of an early investigation of the relationship between FDI and trade, 
still in a general equilibrium framework of the standard Hecksher-Ohlin type, is Mundell’s 
(1957) contribution. The policy questions, which Mundell thought his paper could address, 
were related to the effects of trade protection (for instance in North America in the late 
nineteenth century and in Britain in the twentieth) on factor movements. The well-known 
answers offered by him were “that an increase in trade impediments stimulates factor 
movements and that an increase in restrictions to factor movements stimulates trade” 
[Mundell (1957), p. 321].27 Following this theoretical substitution effect, trade policies in 
favour of tariffs and export costs could be pursued in order to gain from the local production 
stimulated by these impediments to trade.  
 There are many studies that confirm the substitutability and stress the importance of 
tariffs in stimulating FDI, relating to both industrialised countries and underdeveloped ones.28  
The case of Europe, which experienced an upsurge in the inflows from outside even though 
the set of trade barriers against imports from the rest of the world had not changed, is 
commonly thought of as pertaining to another cause: the fact that the abolition of internal 
trade barriers gave rise to a very large market whose size was a major source of attraction for 
foreigner producers. We will come back to this aspect later on. 
The Mundell substitutability result, however, is not shared by all the theoretical 
contributions to this topic. Markusen (1983), for instance, develops a model, which in a sense 
goes behind the Hecksher-Ohlin world insofar as it reaches the different factor endowment 
situation – which is the starting point there – as a result of trade in factors. Thus, beginning 
with equally endowed countries, factors move (because of differences in production 
                                                          
27   Mundell however was well aware of the fact that his analysis “is remote from reality” and that “any policy 
considerations would have to take them into account” where them are the presence in the real world of a 
plurality of factors, goods and countries, the existence of monopolistic competition and differences in 
production functions, and the fact that his model is nonmonetary and static. Mundell (1957), p. 335. 
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technology, and various types of distortions), and this “factor mobility creates a factor 
proportions basis to reinforce the other basis for trade” [Markusen (1983), p. 355].  
Notwithstanding the theoretical peculiarity of this model, one of its predictions – the 
complementary linkage between FDI and trade – soon proved to be supported by data.29 In 
fact, between the traditional and the “new” trade theory, MNEs started to become an object of 
interest, probably representing one if not the main motive for the relative decline of the “old” 
theory as such a powerful theoretical setting, as we have recalled above. Already in the late 
1970s it was explicitly admitted that international direct investment is not consistent with 
some of the more restrictive assumptions of the current theory, and that, moreover, it will not 
take place even relaxing the international factor mobility assumption or the constant return to 
scale one. “International direct investment takes place only in a world which admits revenue-
producing factors which are firm specific on the one hand, and information, communication, 
and transaction costs, which increase with economic distance, on the other” [Hirsch (1976), p. 
258-259].  
If the tariff-jump argument  – which was basically Mundell’s argument – is always valid 
and provides a basis for FDI being a substitute for trade, the presence of MNEs well explains 
their complementary nature as well due, for instance, to increased trade in differentiated 
production, which calls for FDI in order to accompany market penetration. Thus, trade and 
FDI turn out to be probably both substitutes and complements, as they already appeared to be 
in Krugman (1983), which contains in a nutshell the main elements subsequently present in 
the literature, and where it is clearly stated and theoretically demonstrated that the relation 
depends on the kind of integration (horizontal or vertical). With a “product differentiation” 
model, a substitution-type relation arises: “..countries want to trade because they have 
acquired different technologies, taking the form of the knowledge of how to produce different 
products. They can trade this knowledge either directly, through technology transfer within 
multinational firms (or by licensing, except that we have ruled this out); or they can trade it 
indirectly, through trade in commodities embodying their special technological advantages. 
The choice of method depends on the costs: transport costs encourage direct technology 
transfer, costs of multinational operation promote trade. The product differentiation model 
suggests then an interpretation of multinational enterprises as vehicles for trade in 
information. Trade and multinational enterprise are substitutes just as trade and factor 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
28   Reviewed in Caves  (1996), pp. 34-36. 
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mobility are substitutes in the Heckscher-Ohlin model” [Krugman (1983), p. 64].30  With a 
(particular) model of vertical integration (due to monopsony), “trade and multinational 
enterprise will be complements rather than substitutes” [ibid.]. 
Leaving aside the peculiarity of a specific theoretical model, once intermediate goods 
and different stages of production are explicitly taken into account, the negative relationship 
easily turns into a positive one. Vertical FDI will lead to increased exports if the foreign 
affiliates are solely engaged in assembly or sale of goods produced by their parent-firms. The 
same outcome would still be expected when the foreign affiliates’ activity is mainly 
marketing-oriented or is concentrated in the retail sector just in order to increase their parents’ 
exports. Moreover, some vertical integration is often present also in the horizontal FDI, in so 
far as foreign affiliates process semi-final goods imported from the home country in order to 
make them suitable for the foreign market. 
The models in the new trade theory showed relatively little concern with the effects of 
FDI on the balance of trade, both because they aimed at investigating a wider set of different 
issues, like the market structure and the choices of locations, and because the intra-industry 
trade between similar countries leads in itself to fewer worries about pure trade-balance 
considerations. Nevertheless, the connections between FDI and trade are still around, coming 
out mainly as a by-product of the equilibrium solutions of theoretical models. For instance, 
Markusen-Venables (1996) reaches the conclusion of a negative relation between the two, 
showing that the prominent role of MNEs in converging areas would crowd out trade. 
Markusen-Venables (1995), however, predict a non-monotonic relationship: a convergence in 
country characteristics at first leads to an increase and then to a reduction in the volume of 
trade as MNEs begin to displace national firms. Brainard (1993a) too suggests that the effect 
would be negative, even though she is primarily concerned with the relationship between 
exports and foreign affiliates sales rather than FDI.   
On the purely empirical side, the structural lack of coherent data on multinational 
activity for the majority of countries mostly resulted in studies concerning some selected 
areas, particularly USA and Sweden. In any case, the debate over the trade effects of 
investment abroad has no simple resolution. Caves (1996) accurately reviews the main 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
29   Still quoted in Caves  (1996), pp. 30-34. 
30  Transportation costs and tariffs are the costs of producing at home, while the costs of overseas production 
may be due to “unfamiliarity with language, customs or legal system, or difficulty of controlling at a 
distance” Krugman  (1983), p. 63.   
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contributions, and he reaches the conclusion that “..exports and horizontal foreign investment 
should be substitutes for one another” [p. 36, italics added]. Hufbauer et al. (1994) find 
country-dependent results: in Japan and Sweden FDI tends to promote imports more than 
exports, while in the United States it seems to increase exports more than imports. Moreover, 
he surveys in a Table ten major studies that have examined the relationship between outward 
FDI flows and home country exports. These studies agree – with some exceptions – about the 
existence of a positive relation and thus support the complementary thesis.31 The same 
conclusions are offered by analogous and only marginally overlapping Table reported by 
Falzoni (1993).32 More recently, Blomstrom-Kokko (1994) for Sweden, Thomsen – 
Nicolaides (1991) and Morikawa (1998) for Japan (Japan’s share of world FDI stock jumped 
from 4% in the 1980 to 12% by 1990 even though the quota of its overseas production was 
only 6% at the beginning of the 1990s), Wilamoski – Tinkler (1999) for USA/Mexico, all 
confirmed the positive relationship both between FDI and exports and FDI and current-
account balance. Graham (1994) reports a study of his and Bergsten for similar results for 
overall US foreign activity, and of Pearce for a general study on a big sample of the world’s 
largest industrial MNEs,33 concluding that “the international evidence thus largely supports 
the conclusion that DIA (i.e., FDI) and exports are complementary rather than substitutes” 
[Graham (1994), p. 46]. Nevertheless, some doubts as far as Sweden is concerned are recently 
raised  by Braunerhjelm (1998); a negative relationship is found in Barrell– Pain (1997) for 
UK, Germany, France and Sweden,34 and the same result is confirmed more strongly in a later 
contribution of theirs [Barrell – Pain (1999)]. With new panel data studies, there is “evidence 
of a statistically significant negative relationship between net outward investment and export 
performance for many European countries and the US….. In contrast, there was evidence of a 
positive long-term relationship between outward investment and exports for Japan” [ibid., p. 
38]. As a possible explanation for the sharp difference in results with many early studies, like 
                                                          
31 The studies are: Reddaway et al. (1967), Hufbauer and Adler (1968), Bergsten et al. (1978), Swedenborg 
(1979) and (1982), Lipsey and Weiss (1981) and (1984), Blomstrom et al. (1988), and Bergsten and Graham 
(1994). Exceptions are Svensson (1993) which uses firm-level data for Swedish MNEs, and Braunerhjelm 
(1991), still on Sweden.  The third exception is the 1982 first edition of Caves’ book, whose conclusions I 
think can be reasonably replaced by those of the last edition. All quotations come from Hufbauer et al. 
(1994). 
32  The studies are: Lipsey and Weiss (1981) and (1984), Blomstrom et al. (1988), Buiges and Jacquemin (1992), 
Blomstrom and Lipsey (1989), Kravis and Lipsey (1992), all quoted in Falzoni (1993).  
33   These quotations are Bergsten-Graham (1994), and Pearce (1990). See directly Graham (1994).  
34   The authors quote a study by Svensson (1966) on Sweden and a study by Blake and Pain (1994) on UK for 
analogous results. 
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those quoted above,  the authors suggest – rightly in our opinion – that the effects of  FDI on 
trade depend on the maturity and accumulation of  investments over time.    
An interesting result coming from a slightly different perspective is given in Petri 
(1994): focussing on large world regions, he shows that investment and trade intensities35 
across various pairs of them are positively associated, and that, moreover, the highest 
intensities are generally intra-regional. A disproportionate share of countries’ FDI and trade is 
conducted intra-regionally, and although FDI and trade distributions are significantly 
correlated, investment is less bound to an investor’s home region than international trade is 
[Petri (1994), pp. 20-23)]. Distance – which often means culture and perhaps politics – creates 
obstacles to inter-bloc trade and facilitates FDI in order to overcome it.  
Thus, it appears clear once more that the linkages between FDI and trade are extremely 
complex, and we completely agree with those who argue that: “Yet we have a poor 
understanding of the ways in which direct foreign investment is just a simple substitute for 
trade, and the ways in which it is something quite different [Markusen-Venables (1999), p. 
336].  
The sign of the correlation closely depends at least on the typology of the specific 
industrial sector and on the nature of  the investment as well. Resource seeking and trade 
facilitating investments tend to be complementary to trade and to increase it: while the latter is 
such by its own nature, the former acts in a more complex way, causing imports in the short 
run, and export only in the long-run after having hopefully improved the competitiveness of 
the country. The market-oriented investments can have a mixed role with a final outcome 
difficult to forecast: they can displace exports, thus tending  to be a substitute for trade, but 
they can also create trade through new exports from the parent or other national firms to the 
affiliates or to other foreign firms in goods complementary to those supplied by the affiliates. 
Last but not least, the so called “strategic” investment (those performed in order to modify 
rivalry oligopolistic relations) can have dubious effects as well, depending on whether or not 
the affiliates would assume an “autonomous” role in the horizontal integration process. If they 
would become differentiated production units, exports to the home country will be created (as 
well as imports from other affiliates in other countries).  
                                                          
35   Here intensity is measured by a gravity index. 
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Very few studies are present in the economic literature that aim at testing these firm-
decisions. Recently, Thomsen-Nicolaides (1991) – reviewing questionnaire - based surveys36 
for a miscellaneous of  countries – and Mutinelli-Piscitello (1997) with the same methodology 
for Italy vis-à-vis the CEECs, they both find that market seeking is the answer in the majority 
of cases.  
 
 
 
II.2 FDI and labour and capital markets 
A very common worry about FDI is its impact on factor markets. Still the assessment of 
these effects is a difficult task.37  
As far as the labour market is concerned, the main question is: does FDI export jobs? 
The question is complex, being not just related to job destruction, but also to the lack of job 
creation.38 In the category of job destruction, the negative effect on employment can result 
from a reduction in domestic output or it can originate from the existence of rigidities (poor 
mobility or excessive segmentation) in  the labour market itself, which come into play when 
there is a shift in the composition of output. The first of the two cases emerges depending on 
when, in what way, and how far FDI and trade are substitutes. As was evident from the 
discussion in the preceding section, there is no clear answer to this question. The second case 
is a more complicated one and it too does not have a unique answer. In fact, it requires that 
FDI and trade be complementary, and that the domestic sectors activated by the increase in 
the international production cannot react positively because of the presence of rigidities. Any 
mismatch can be expected in the future either to diminish, with the increase in education 
which should give more flexibility to the labour market, or to become even more acute, along 
with the increase in skill-specialisation. We will briefly come back to the “rigidity” (relative 
immobility of labour) later on.      
                                                          
36   More precisely, Thomsen – Nicolaides (1991) report six different surveys.  
37   “There is still considerable divergence in views among economists about the employment effects of foreign 
direct investment [……]. It appears that we need more case studies of the actual investment experiences of 
various firms and industries in different countries before we can make substantial progress in better 
understanding  the employment effects of foreign direct investment” [Baldwin (1995), p. 49]. 
38   It is unavoidable the quotation from Graham – Krugman [(1995), p. 60]: “..we regard an emphasis on job 
creation or destruction as fundamentally mistaken”. As a matter of fact, it is widely recognised that 
employment in the US is determined by supply, not demand, as the authors add further. Thus, “the net impact 
of FDI on US employment is approximately zero”. [Ibid., p.62], italics in original. 
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In the lack-of-job-creation category, the impact on the labour market is likely to come 
through the effects of FDI on real domestic capital. What would entrepreneurs have done as 
an alternative to overseas production or investment? The job content of an FDI would have 
occurred in the source country instead of the receiving country, and more jobs could have 
perhaps been created in an upstream/downstream chain. This statement is true whether FDI 
takes the form of a green-field investment or of a merger or an acquisition, in so far as a unit 
of investment abroad displaces investment at home. This is a well known and controversial 
topic in the recent literature on capital  movements, mainly due to a seminal quantitative study 
by Feldstein (1994), whose result is that “each dollar of  outbound FDI reduces domestic 
investment by approximately one dollar” [Feldstein (1994), p. 16]. A similar conclusion was 
reached in a previous study by Stevens – Lipsey  (1992), which analyses exclusively the 
financial side of this investment decision, finding that more investment in one location  (for 
instance, abroad) is likely to raise the total debt of the firm or its debt/equity ratio, thus 
increasing its cost of financing and inducing the firm to reduce investment in another location 
(for instance, at home). A critical view, shared by several scholars is, for instance, that of 
Graham (1994) who questions the validity of approaches based on national accounting à-là-
Feldstein, and of statements like the one that the outflow of direct investment reduces 
domestic savings needed to finance domestic investment, which is the implicit view in the 
Stevens-Lipsey contribution. He adds evidence of an opposite relationship for Canada39 and, 
moreover and more interestingly, he puts the discussion into the general context of the 
economic geography approach: “to the extent that direct investment goes to new clusters it 
will be associated with growing activities and hence with increased domestic investment in 
these activities” [Graham (1994), p. 146]. 
As far as the quality and composition of the labour force is concerned, there is some 
evidence that changes are called for in countries where MNEs play a substantial role, as in 
Sweden for instance, where there appears to have been a shift in labour demand favouring 
white collar jobs at the expense of blue collar ones [Blomström – Kokko (1994)], even though 
this relationship has become weaker over time [Blomstrom – Fors – Lipsey (1997)]. Several 
other studies support this evidence, thus creating wider agreement about this effect of FDI on 
the labour market [Gunderson-Verma (1994), p…]. Still Blomstrom – Fors – Lipsey (1997) 
have another interesting result concerning the relationship between the employment of the 
                                                          
39   Quoting a study by Rao-Lagault-Ahmad (1994). 
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MNE and the employment of its affiliates. While Swedish firms employ more labour at home 
when they produce more abroad, US firms do the exact opposite: larger foreign production is 
associated with smaller parent employment when the variable for foreign production is split 
into developed and developing countries. They attribute this result to the US firms giving the 
labour-intensive portion of their production to affiliates in low-wage countries because of the 
high price of unskilled labour in the US, whereas this does not happen in Sweden, whose 
foreign production is mainly directed towards high-income countries (USA and Europe). The 
result as far as the USA is concerned is consistent with that of  Brainard – Riker  (1997), who 
found that, on aggregate, substitution between labour employed by parents and affiliates 
abroad is low. A more recent contribution [Braconier – Ekholm (2001)]  appears to challenge 
the above result for Sweden, though it is in line with the main argument: when Swedish 
MNEs data are used to analyse the expansion towards the CEEs (low-wages countries), the 
employment in the affiliates located in other European low-wage countries declines, and some 
effect spreads also to the home country.  
Last but not least, there can be some political concern about the existence of a further 
and subtler effect of FDI on the labour market: changes in the way it is regulated and 
functions are likely to be implemented either to retrain the outbound and to foster the inbound 
flows. 
 
II. The effects of FDI: host-country effect   
The host-market effect, that is how the destination-countries’ economies perform after 
FDI inflows, is the other main concern – coupled with the home-market effect – of the 
literature on the consequences of the FDI. 
This is a wide topic mainly covered in the literature on Development Economics where 
the role of MNEs was initially investigated. As we have already recalled, the MNEs’ activity 
across industrialised countries is a fairly recent phenomenon, while in the past decades the 
role of the MNEs has been prominent mainly vis-à-vis the underdeveloped countries, 
something that made the concern about the degree of exploitation of those economies one of 
the central issues of left-wing political and economic thought. Many studies examined the 
effects of foreign capital on the domestic rate of growth, and on the increased ability to export 
both through rising competition in the local market and via specific trade agreements. The 
relative economic success – sometimes remarkable, like in the case of the so-called Asian 
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Tigers – of several underdeveloped economies, and the spreading of MNEs activity over 
industrialised countries lightened the concern about exploitation, and by the 1980s the 
conventional wisdom was viewing FDI as a suitable means to enhance competitiveness and 
accelerate growth.40 The tendency of governments to implement specific economic policies in 
order to favour FDI reached its zenith in terms of beneficial effects in the Irish case, which in 
turn provided further grounds to evaluate the effects of FDI.  In Ireland a strategic and 
successful policy was effectively implemented, combining fiscal and financial incentives to 
firms with large regional investment in infrastructures, aiming to develop efficient export-led 
manufacturing and tradable services sectors, to increase the raise of new greenfield 
investment by foreign companies, and to form linkages between foreign and indigenous 
companies, with the target of creating industrial clusters in certain sub-sectors.41 We will 
return to the cluster-issue in the next section.  
From the theoretical point of view, the benefits of FDI to the host countries come from 
several different sources, all gathered together into two main categories: the transfer of 
technology and the externalities in the form of spillovers, that is, everything else that derives 
from FDI other than technology transfer [Lipsey (1991), pp. 363-365]; or, in a slightly 
different and perhaps more precise view, “productivity spillovers” and “market access 
spillovers” [Blomström – Kokko (1998), pp. 248]. In fact, the technology transfers in a proper 
sense cannot be other than “direct”, that is, transfers to the affiliates for intermediary, capital 
goods, or specialised equipment to be used by them, R&D-generated knowledge, instruction 
programs with visits and exchange of personnel, and the like.42 Nevertheless, once done, they 
must create spillovers to make the host country benefit from that, and it is commonly 
understood that the inflows of new technology and working practises from the affiliates create 
a significant potential for spillovers to local firms in the host country.  
Still following Blomström – Kokko [(1998), pp. 248], “productivity spillovers” 
originate when (i) a local firm improves its productivity by copying some technology used by 
MNC affiliates operating in the local market; (ii)  the entry of an affiliate leads to greater 
                                                          
40   Suspects about these beneficial aspects are of course still present among economists, and some of us think 
that the liberalisation of FDI contributed to enhance too a perverse sort of competitiveness, that is to say the 
pervasive tendency among underdeveloped countries to compete by lowering social standards in order to 
maintain their vantage in the production costs. For this view, see for instance Kozul-Wright and Rowthorn 
(1998), p. 86. 
41   For a general assessment of the Irish experience, see, inter alia,  Barry – Bradley (1997), Ruane  – Görg 
(1999), Braunerhjelm et al., (2000), pp. 59 onward.  For the specific aspect of the demonstration effect, see 
Barry – Görg – Strobl (2001). 
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competition in the host economy, so that local firms are forced to use existing technology and 
resources more efficiently; (iii) competition forces local firms to search for new, more 
efficient technology.43 “Market access spillovers” occur when local firms become able to 
manage the complex aspects of internalisation (marketing, distribution and servicing) because 
of the presence of MNEs. This can happen because local firms are subcontractors or suppliers 
of the MNE, and learn how to do the job, or simply because they copy what an MNE is doing 
[ibid., pp.253-254].44 
The circumstances thanks to which all these effects spill over are very numerous and 
almost impossible to classify. Thus, spillovers are obviously difficult to measure and studies 
specifically devoted to quantifying them are few.45 The evidence is spotting: they exist, they 
seem to be of a substantial amount both within and between industries, but there is no strong 
evidence on their exact nature; they seem to be very different across countries and industries 
and highly dependent on local capabilities.46  Again quoting from Blomström – Kokko 
(1998), let us just recall the most robust evidence: (I) backward linkages, that is an affiliate’s 
relationship with suppliers, exist and are strengthening, while forward linkages – its contact 
with customers – are weaker but growing in importance; (II) support for spillovers from 
training exists and comes mainly from studies on developing countries, which is a plausible 
result, given their probable weaker educational system.  
The results are, on the contrary, fairly ambiguous, for the “demonstration” and 
competition effects. As far as we know there are two different meanings of the word 
“demonstration” in the literature. The first indicates a situation where uncertainty about 
location pushes towards imitative behaviours of other firms’ location decisions. Thus, a 
location becomes “good” and increases the incentives for additional firms to locate there, 
besides the efficiency of agglomeration.  This interpretation of the “demonstration” process is 
related more to the agglomeration issue – to which we will come back in the next section – 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
42   For an evidence of these transfers, see for instance, Fors (1996). 
43  There is substantial econometric evidence of a positive effect of MNEs’  presence on total factor productivity 
of the local firms, in an intra-industry framework. For a discussion of productivity spillovers from FDI, see 
Blomström (1991). 
44   Aitken-Hanson-Harrison  (1994) – studying Mexico – provide statistical support for the role of foreign firms 
as “catalysts” for other exporters, as an evidence of  “market-access spillovers”. This study is one of the few 
which treats inter-industry spillovers. On the contrary, under the profile of intra-industry spillovers, and again 
for Mexico, Blomstrom (1989) finds that foreign investment did not speed up the transfer of any specific 
technology to Mexico, but the results indicate that the competitive pressure induced by the MNEs may be 
important. 
45   Reviewed in Blomström-Kokko (1998). 
46   See Blomström (1991). 
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and by consequence to the relationship among foreign firms.47 The second interpretation of 
the “demonstration” effect relates, on the contrary, to the interaction between foreign and 
local firms, and indicates the circumstance of  local firms adopting new technologies because 
the presence of MNEs has made them known and familiar.48  
Unfortunately, it is very difficult to quantify it separately49 from other joint effects, like 
the competition effect, which is another important source of spillovers coming from the 
change in the local market structure brought about by the entrance (and presence) of MNEs. 
Leaving aside the controversial aspect of the direction of causality between FDI and industrial 
concentration (chickens, eggs, and causality: which came first?), the entrance of MNEs to a 
market in the form of greenfield investment doubtless increases competition in the short run. 
The increased competition in one sector could make the local firms of this sector worse off, if 
they are not able to react positively, or better off, if they evolve and eventually adopt more 
efficient management and labour practices. At the same time the increased competition of that 
sector makes other sectors’ firms better off through forward and backward linkages, which are 
the effects referred to under Section I. Both aspects are beneficial: the former effect is likely 
to reduce prices for customer firms, the latter will generate a new demand for local 
production, thus increasing the pace at which competing products and processes of domestic 
origin appear in the local market, or helping in developing proper local markets from the 
bottom where they do not yet exist.50 Going back to Blomström – Kokko (1998), 
“…[MNCs]…initially add to the number of firms in the market. In the long run, MNCs may 
contribute to some increase in concentration, but efficiency may still benefit…” [p.265]. It 
must be added that most of the evidence refers to developed countries, and that as far as 
underdeveloped countries are concerned, “it is not possible to disregard the risk that MNC 
entry into developing countries replaces local production and forces local firms out of 
business, rather than forcing them to become more efficient” [ibid., p. 265]. 
                                                          
47 As far as we know the unique contribution which intends to split between the efficiency of the agglomeration 
effect and the demonstration effect is the recent Barry – Görg – Strobl (2001). 
48   The case-studies on this point are reviewed in Blomström-Kokko (1998), p. 261. 
49   “One reason is that pure demonstration effect often take place unconsciously: it is seldom documented how 
and when a firm first learns about a new technology or product that is subsequently adopted” [Blomström-
Kokko (1998), p. 261]. 
50   See Markuse-Venables (1999), for a theoretical model where the entry of  MNEs in the downstream industry 
acts as a catalyst for local firms. Empirical evidence of the catalyst role of MNEs’ activity can be found in 
Blomström-Wolff (1994) for Mexico, but the hypothesis is rejected by Haddad-Harrison (1993) for Morocco, 
using plant-level data. 
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Last but not least, an interesting point is whether the degree of ownership induces any 
difference in the degree of  spillover. Recalling what was already stated before, a firm can 
choose between exports and some form of more direct participation in the foreign market, can 
then choose between FDI and licensing (or franchising or other marketing contracts, all 
pertaining to the category of arm’s-length transactions), but can also choose – within an 
equity-participation – between a majority (of course including  full ownership), or a minority 
partnership, that is, a joint venture. Majority-ownership encourages MNEs to transfer 
advanced technology in order to maximise profits, but deprives them of strategic local 
channels to better penetrate the host-country’s market. Joint ventures can allow a better 
awareness of the social and business environment but induce MNEs to transfer only old 
technology in order to protect themselves from future local competition, thus contributing 
very little to local development. Strong evidence of a relationship between degree of 
ownership and “quality” of the spillover is provided for the Swedish case by Blomström–
Zejan (1991), who also find that firms with brief experience of foreign production and highly 
diversified production are the most likely to choose minority ventures, thus giving this form 
of equity participation a minor role in transferring benefits (which are supposed to be more 
relevant if coming from well-established and sectorally grounded MNEs). Also for Greece 
[Dimelis-Louri (2001)], there is evidence of a relationship between the degree of ownership 
and the efficiency and productivity gains. On the contrary, Blomstrom-Sjoholm [1999] do not 
find, in their broad study on Indonesian firms, any substantial link between ownership and the 
degree of local spillover, which in this case is mainly due to the increase in the 
competitiveness of local firms. Country-specific characteristics – such as regulation for 
instance – could of course matter for this type of results, which would suggest a comparative 
approach across different institutional settings. 
 
III. FDI and location  
III.1 The European context 
The prediction of Krugman's core-periphery  model is a clear demarcation between an 
industrial and an agricultural zone, which fits nicely with the American context of industrial 
coastal belts and an agricultural South and Midwest. In Europe, however -  a fragmented area 
very far from the American level of integration - borders still exist and borders matter,51 even 
                                                          
51   "…and the sheer nuisance presented by the existence of a border….[are] often enough to block the expansion 
of a successful industrial district beyond its national market" [Krugmanl–Venables (1996), p. 960] 
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though in an ambiguous way. In fact, on the one hand continuing institutional rigidities or 
cultural and linguistic barriers could contribute to keeping a country relatively "isolate" even 
within a process of integration, giving further substance to physical borders.  On the other 
hand, the process of integration in itself could strengthen affinities, giving rise to a kind of 
neighbouring effect52 where the re-organisation of economic activity produces a localisation 
pattern with domestic geographic units (regions, for instance) tied to nearby foreign 
geographic units. In fact, even though trade and non-trade barriers should disappear with the 
completion of the internal market program, there is some evidence that border effects extend 
to smaller units, thus suggesting further reasons for the predominance of local trade over 
"international" trade.53 Since “borders” – both geographical and cultural – appear to matter, 
greater concentration in Europe could equally mean core-periphery-type outcomes among 
countries or groups of countries, within countries, and among regions formed by areas 
belonging to different countries as well, if affinities weigh more than boundaries.54   
As a final consideration, a more spurious core-periphery landscape could come about 
just because the forces that trigger agglomeration are relatively powerful in some sectors and 
weak across sectors, thus giving rise to agglomeration of each of these sectors. 
Europe differs from the US also from another and not trivial point of view: the shortage 
of (comparable) data. This simple fact has consequences on the choice of the  level of 
aggregation, which in turn has consequences for the results: for instance, the measures of 
intra-industry trade (IIT) – which is strictly related to specialisation in the new trade/new 
economic geography theories55 – change with the level of aggregation, and the higher the 
latter, the lower the revealed IIT.  Another problem related to aggregation is that of the 
product categories in the international statistics. These categories are not strictly defined in 
terms of similarity of input requirements, and therefore would not properly measure, again,  
                                                          
52  As it appears to exist in Europe, at least as far as unemployment is concerned: "Unemployment outcomes are 
so much more homogeneous across neighbours, than across regions in the same member State” [Overman–
Puga (1999), p. 26]. On the relevance or irrelevance of borders, the same authors suggest: "…ongoing 
European integration may mean that national borders are becoming less important in determining regional 
outcomes. Geographical location may still matter however, though perhaps at levels below the nation state" 
[ibidem, p. 14]. 
53   See Chen (2002) for a thorough study on this subject and for the reported literature.  
54  Still on unemployment in Europe: "These clusters do not conform to a standard core-periphery gradient. 
Instead high and low unemployment clusters have appeared in both the core and the periphery of the EU, 
often extending across national borders" [Overman – Puga (1999), p. 24]. 
55  More precisely, high IIT means a low level of specialisation:  IIT will be at the maximum if the propensities 
to trade are the same across products in the same industry. In the cross-country-region context, high IIT is an 
indicator of industrial dispersion.  
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the IIT.56 The methodology of aggregation is responsible for some striking results common to 
both the USA and Europe, for instance the fact that some "new" industrial activities, often 
technology- and scale-intensive, are recorded within "old" statistical categories, thus 
producing biases in the specialisation measurement.57 
 Moreover, answers about the existence and the relevance of a phenomenon (industrial 
concentration or dispersion, in this case) can be credible or unreliable depending on the 
appropriateness of the variable chosen to represent it. This is a common shortcoming, but it is 
a particularly delicate task for Europe, given the generally poor quality and scarcity of data 
that force the choice of some variables rather than others. A typical example in this area is the 
wide use of trade data, readily available at a high level of disaggregation and comparable, 
instead of production data, whilst it is obvious that the latter is the right one for the evaluation 
of industrial specialisation and concentration.58  
Even though the European reality differs from the American one, the US represent a 
natural - if not the only - benchmark to assess what is going on in Europe after Union has 
been completed. Since there is evidence [inter alia, Kim (1995), Ellison–Glaeser (1997)] of a 
non-random (i.e., not determined by purely idiosyncratic factors) spatial distribution of 
industrial activities in the US, and since economic integration is widely reputed to be one of 
the protagonists of the play,59 it is generally expected that the completion of European 
integration would lead to a re-organisation of the productive activity (and to a change in the 
European economic geography) in so far as it will change the incentives for agglomeration. 
The single currency and the reduced transaction costs should help firms in exploiting with 
greater efficiency some of the more intrinsic characteristics of industrial location, such as 
geography strictu sensu (for instance, closeness to transportation hubs) or better availability of 
endowment (for instance, proximity to research-labs). At the same time, integration should 
accelerate the process of industrial agglomeration if some profitability accrues to the firm 
through being close to other firms. Since the theory suggests this outcome as a likely one after 
                                                          
56  This is what Gray calls "categorical aggregation": "..such observed intra-industry trade derives simply from 
the aggregation within a single trade category of goods which are quite different in terms of either input-mix 
or end-use" [Gray (1979), p. 87]. 
57  The high-technology sectors, which are incidentally the most interesting under the profile of the new theories, 
are “buried in meaningless aggregates” [Krugman (1991b), p. 59]. On this point, see also Brülhart (2000).  
58   For a detailed discussion on this point, see Brülhart (1998a) 
59  The US itself is the outcome of a past process of integration, and the recent formation of NAFTA appears to 
have influenced the spatial organisation of production [see inter alia, Hanson (1998)]. 
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the reduction in trade costs60  following greater integration, and since there is evidence 
[Krugman (1991b)] that industrial concentration is greater (a less dispersed and more 
specialised industrial geography) in the USA than in Europe, agglomeration is expected to 
increase in the EU as well. Thus, many scholars turned to measuring its current presence in 
the member countries, and its change through time and across space.  
 
III.2 The empirical evidence 
The simple fact of whether foreign capital has indeed been increasingly attracted by the 
integration in Europe has been the first to be investigated. In fact, it is plausible - as 
Yannopoulos [1990], for instance, argues - that market expansion, creation of scale-
economies, production efficiency and other characteristics of a customs union will promote 
greater innovative activity, larger R&D, more pervasive spill-overs, thus reinforcing the 
ownership advantages and giving stimulus to create additional direct investment. As a matter 
of fact, these kinds of agglomeration advantages (dynamic agglomeration economies) are 
reputed to be more and more important, while the easy access to inputs and to final markets 
are of diminishing importance.61 We will briefly review the main recent results on these two 
strictly correlated but logically distinct themes, starting from the second one and returning 
later to the first.62  
Yannopoulos [1990] gives an overview of the literature about the problem of the 
relationship between European integration and direct investment till the 1990s. The empirical 
debate in the late 1960s and early 1970s showed that the locational pattern of total US 
investment abroad changed significantly subsequent to the formation of the EC, and that the 
latter definitely had a strong influence on the former. Moreover, it appeared also sufficiently 
convincing that the process of economic integration had a definite influence on this change. 
The intra-EC investment too appeared to experience a change: some empirical studies - 
reviewed in the article - revealed that the formation of a European customs union coincided 
with a rise in the EC non-domestic production of European Community firms through an 
increase in the number of foreign subsidiaries of EC firms established in other countries of the 
                                                          
60  Let us quote just one of the many places that enunciate this theoretical point: "..the combination of input-
output linkages and imperfect competition generates forces for agglomeration of activity [that] are relatively 
more powerful at low trade costs" [Venables (1995), p. 299]. This statement does not contradict the one from 
Krugman -Venables (1990), p. 74, quoted above at p. 3. 
61   See Porter (1996), pp. 86-87 for a quick assessment of this point, and Porter's research in its entirety. 
62   We will not mention what is going on vis-à-vis the CEECs, mainly for space reasons.  
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Community. The conclusion of this first look at the relationship between the integration 
process and direct investment is that the latter is very likely to occur following the former, but 
its intensity and timing will depend on various factors, among which it would be relevant to 
check which kind of  removal (of  tariff or non-tariff barriers, respectively) is at work. 
Another more recent overview of the same issue [Dunning (1997a) and (1997b)] asserts 
that the studies about the effect of the Internal Market Program on FDI all agreed about the 
fact that it was conditional upon the type of investment being considered, since they supported 
the relationship but they also did not deny the effect of other determinants. Thus, it is evident 
that the formation of the European Economic Community has stimulated MNEs' activity 
[Barrell-Pain (1997a), (1997b), (1999a), (1999b), Braunerhjelm et al.,  (2000)], and that its 
enlargements appears to have attracted foreign capital either from inside or outside the EC 
[Yannopoulos (1992, p. 329)].  
As far as the first theme is concerned - location and re-location of industry - a 
comparison of the studies on the "new" European geography" (if any) is not easy because the 
empirical evidence is still spotty and the results are very dependent on the measures (indices) 
and on the quality of data; nor are these supported, as we have seen, by well-defined 
theoretical outcomes that can help in discriminating among the empirical evidence.63 It is 
worthwhile stressing that FDI disappear from the scene when industrial location is at issue, as 
if FDI would not be merely the way in which agglomeration decisions become effective at an 
international level. As a matter of fact, the tendency towards agglomeration in FDI has not 
received much attention, because the perspective has been mainly regional and national, 
instead of international. A notable exception is Braunerhjelm – Svensson (1996), who address 
specifically this problem and find a positive correlation between overseas operation of 
Swedish MNEs and the dimension of the industry in the host countries, where firms do not yet 
have any affiliate production. A subsequent contribution by the same authors [Braunerhjelm – 
Svensson (1998)] – where they also review the very few studies which tried to fill this gap in 
the literature – specifies that this pattern of agglomeration is limited to R&D intensive 
production, in line with the results of the literature on spill-overs 
In the static picture, where FDI are behind the scenes, two topics  are investigated in the 
empirical research: whether European countries have become more specialised in their 
manufacturing production, and whether industries have become more geographically 
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concentrated in Europe, following the American model. We will give general answers to these 
questions by extrapolating the results that enjoy the broadest consensus in the scholarly 
contributions, which are numerically scanty but use a variety of methods and data. None deny 
that perhaps it is time to pay greater attention to the details of these contributions, since many 
of us are convinced that a lot of more and more refined empirical work is necessary; 
nevertheless, here we prefer just to outline the main results in a very concise but updated 
review, in order to fix the key findings so far relating to the European context.64   
The answers given by Amiti (1998) and (1999) to the two questions recalled above – 
using country- and industry-Gini indices based on production data for 27 manufacturing 
industries – are both positive even though the evidence is mixed. Specialisation in Europe 
increased, but only six countries out of ten became more specialised between 1968 and 1990, 
and one did not change its industrial profile. The level of geographical concentration 
increased over time for seventeen out of twenty-seven industries (thirty out of sixty-five in 
Amiti [1999]) while six of them (twelve, respectively) experienced a fall in concentration. 
Without entering into the details, the geographically concentrated industries are those subject 
to scale economies and that use a high proportion of intermediate inputs, thus "confirming" 
some of the new economic geography suggestions.65 These results are consistent with the 
ones by Brülhart – Torstensson (1996), who use employment and trade data and who add 
some more evidence: concentration has occurred in central regions - with good market access 
- rather than in peripheral ones. There are also positive results about the existence of a non-
monotonic relationship between intra-EU  trade costs and intra-industry trade, but they are 
less clear-cut.  
Brülhart (1998b) – drawing on both trade and production data – again finds that the 
degree of industrial specialisation among EU countries has increased in the 1980s, that 
industries characterised by strong internal economies of scale are localised at the EU core and 
have low IIT; that labour-intensive industries are found to be relatively dispersed over the 
whole of the EU, and that they have high IIT; and that according to employment data, high-
tech industries in the EU are highly localised, but not along a centre-periphery gradient. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
63  On the contrary, very often in this literature the empirical findings are taken as a tool to discriminate between 
theories. See for instance Kim (1995) and Davis – Weinstein (1996) and (1999). 
64  See also Brulhart (1998a) and Overman et al. (2001), for a brief account of some of the papers mentioned 
here.  
65   With the caveats recalled above about the concepts of agglomeration, concentration, location, and the data-
problem. 
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Moreover, the trend concerning these industries came to a halt, whilst  there appears to be 
greater scope for inter-industry specialisation industries which are mainly sensitive to other 
locational determinants, such as factor costs.  
The fact that there is a certain degree of localisation in high-tech sectors emerges also 
from Guerrieri–Manzocchi (1996), who find different – and persistent – specialisation  
patterns in the two science-based (bio-chemicals and computers) and the two scale-intensive 
sectors (motor vehicles and electric/electronic goods) across the four countries considered 
(France, United Kingdom, Italy and Germany), thus rejecting the hypothesis of structural 
convergence, i.e., a broadly similar industrial landscape all over Europe. On a careful 
examination, this scenario could be confirmed also by a "traditional" study of convergence 
where the main finding is that both σ and β convergence show that "the income dispersion of 
outer peripheral regions decrease only after 1987; central regions show just an opposite 
pattern, that is income dispersion decreased until 1987 and then slowly increased." 
[Rombaldoni, 1998, p. 446]. This outcome could easily be read as the welfare counterpart of 
the halt in the specialisation process in high-tech industries (centrally located) and the rise of a 
specialisation process in labour-intensive industries (more peripherally located). However, 
this first wave of empirical studies does not claim to offer a consistent and comprehensive 
description of specialisation trends in the EU. 
Subsequent studies confirm the lack of a clear scenario, and also admit that there are 
contrasting results when different data sets are used: for instance, Brülhart (2000) finds that 
trade data show rising IIT (greater locational dispersion) whilst production data suggest 
increasing concentration and agglomeration. Again in Brülhart (2000) it appears that there is 
no clear evidence of agglomeration of manufacturing activities in core EU countries (17 out 
of  32 industries are concentrated in peripheral rather than central countries), no evidence that 
market integration in the EU might stimulate a more clustered industrial geography, and no 
evidence as well that the size of plant-specific scale economies affect significantly the 
specialisation level of an industry. On scale economies, Henriksen et al. (2001) support the 
view that there are significant differences across industries and industrial clustering regarding 
the level at which economies of scale – both external and internal  – are present. Their 
conclusion is that external economies of scale, regardless of the source, are considerably less 
prevalent than are internal economies arising from increasing returns at the level of the 
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national industry or firm. Thus, positive externalities in Europe appear to be limited in a 
geographical as well as technological sense.  
This is a very interesting result that deserves a further investigation since it appears to 
contradict recent findings from a review  aimed at seeing “whether  this superficial impression 
is confirmed upon closer examination of the literature” [Hanson (2000), p.1]. The “superficial 
impression” is the existence of evidence in support of the economies of scale being an 
explanation for spatial agglomeration. After a careful examination of the main (non-
European) literature in the light of the key estimation issues, Hanson’s conclusion is that “the 
body of empirical results suggest that location-specific externalities exist and influence the 
spatial distribution of economic activity” [ibidem, p. 28].  
Lastly, Midelfart-Knarvik et al. (2000) - in a large report prepared for the European 
Commission - provide many results. The most noteworthy of these are that many European 
countries had a significantly similar industrial structure in the 1970s, but that this trend was 
reversed starting in the early 1980s (a result consistent with Guerrieri-Manzocchi (1996)); that 
European industrial structure is diverging, showing that a concentration process is under way; 
that approximately one half of high-tech industries – which are relatively concentrated 
industries – are moving back towards spreading over more peripheral countries; that some 
unskilled labour-intensive industries experienced a relative contraction and a spatial 
concentration in peripheral low-wage economies (these two results are consistent with 
Brülhart–Torstensson (1996)); that services are still more dispersed than manufacturing. 
 
Concluding remarks 
This paper focused on FDI and MNEs, the two distinct sides of the same coin: the 
internationalisation of production. There as been a renewed interest on both, given the 
impressive upsurge of  the former and the appearance of a new suitable theoretical setting for the 
latter. We discussed the main turning points in the evolution of the theory  of trade and economic 
geography, which produced a model able to stylise the MNEs’ endogenous formation and 
activity. We then looked at the main empirical results about FDI and trade, labour and capital 
market in the home country, and those about the specific effects of FDI on the host countries 
through spillovers.  We turned subsequently to the assessment of the effects of the European 
economic integration process on MNEs’ activity in the form of FDI, reviewing the main 
empirical studies.  
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The overall conclusion is that there are not clear-cut empirical results on the main issues 
related to FDI, even on the most traditional ones: there is strong empirical support for both 
substitutability and complementary nature of FDI and trade and there is no robust aggregate 
result on the relationship between FDI and the labour/capital markets; spillovers exist and seem 
to be of substantial amount, but very different across countries and industries. As far as industrial 
re-location is concerned, a precise understanding on what is going on in Europe is far from being 
available. It appears that agglomeration forces are at work in Europe, and have attracted FDI; 
industrial structure at country level seems divergent; concentration occurred in central regions 
more than in peripheral ones, high-tech industries are highly localised but not along a centre-
periphery gradient, and an inversion in this tendency seems to arise. However, no doubts that 
much more work has to be done.  
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